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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In other words, consciousness is not passive and epiphenom-
enal, but one of the most complex, and, in its consequences, 
the most unpredictable, of those self-organizing processes 
which characterize all living things (Fair, 1970, p. 49). 
The interrelations of self-awareness, social facilitation effects, 
and anxiety have recently been examined by Innes and Young (1975), 
Liebling and Shaver (1973), and Henchy and Glass (1968), among others. 
These three factors each affect performance as a function of their 
magnitude and direction. In general, task performance is facilitated 
by a low anxiety state, presence of others, and-subjective self-
awareness. High anxiety levels, objective self-awareness, and absence 
of others tend to debilitate performance. 
The impact of different levels of self-awareness, anxiety, and 
presence of others on performance depends on the perception and utili-
zation of information about the self. The 11 Self 11 has been variously 
conceptualized as the union of elements (as body, emotions, thought, 
sensations) that constitute the individuality and identity of a person 
(Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary), and as the sum total of 
the individual's capacities (Goldstein, 1939). A more limited meaning 
refers to the capacity of the individual to have conscious awareness 
of his/her activities and through this awareness to exercise a measure 
of freedom in directing these activities (Sullivan, 1947). The type 
of information which may be perceived by the experiencing individual 
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differ for different levels of anxiety, self-awareness, and social 
facilitation. 
Objective Self-Awareness 
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Self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) distinguishes 
between subjective self-awareness, in which attention is directed to 
events external to the self, and objective self-awareness, where the 
individual is the object of his/her own attentional focus. With objec-
tive se lf-avJat'eness, attention is directed toward se 1 f-percepti on and 
current performance is evaluated according to an internalized standard 
of excellence, i.e., the individual is occupied in a process of self-
judgment. The effect of objective self-awareness conditi~ns is to 
redefine attentional focus. Attention previously utilized in world 
perception must now, to some degree, be used for- self-monitoring pro-
cesses. 
Social Facilitation 
Social facilitation effects (cf. Zajonc, 1965) refer to the incre-
ment in performance often observed when individuals work in the 
presence of relevant others. Within this framework, the individual 
directs some portion of his attention to perception of others and possi-
bly engages in comparison of current performance with social standards 
of acceptability; i.e., the individual is again occupied in a process 
of self-judgment. Performance increments are observed as long as the 
task requires emission of dominant responses. With unfamiliar tasks, 
the attentional split between world perception and self-monitoring 
processes results in performance decrements. 
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Anxiety 
Anxiety is a subjectively experienced painful or apprehensive un-
easiness of mind, often occurring with a concurrent autonomic nervous 
system arousal. Although personality theorists deal with the origin, 
focus, and process of anxiety responses in different manners, the con-
sensus seems to suggest that anxiety is the result of an organismic 
response to a perceived discrepancy between the self 1 s current perform-
ance and some standard of reference, with probable effects on behavior, 
self-perception, self and social judgments. Anxiety affects self-
awareness as a function of the amount of experienced anxiety, the sali-
ence of the threat, and the capacity of the individual to tolerate 
anxiety. 
Attentional Focus 
Anxiety, objective self-awareness, and social facilitation each 
affect the attentional focus of the experiencing individual. The self 
is engaged in monitoring both internal processes and external events 
and continuously evaluating the adequacy of performance within the 
current situation. If the self-monitoring process monopolizes avail-
able attention and competes with perception of external task-relevant 
cues, decrements in performance are to be expected. As long as anxiety, 
objective self-avJareness, and social facilitation are low, the self is 
engaged primarily in monitoring external events to the exclusion of 
self-monitoring processes. Performance of unlearned or novel tasks is 
expected to be facilitated by these conditions. 
Specifically, low objective self-awareness results in a stable ex-
ternal attentional focus. The self is able to respond to task-relevant 
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cues without allocating attention to self-monitoring processes. Low 
social facilitation conditions should have a similar performance pat-
tern, for slightly different reasons. With presence of others some 
attention is required to perceive and evaluate the others to the detri-
ment of task-related cue perception. Inasmuch as mere presence of 
others is a stimulus provoking some objective self-awareness, the 
results of social facilitation conditions may be confounded with objec-
tive self-awareness conditions. A similar interaction between anxiety 
and objective self-awareness is possible in that anxiety is a response 
to an ego-threat, a threat to the focus of self-awareness. The purpose 
of the present research is to investigate the direct effects of anxiety, 
objective self-awareness, and social facilitation on task performance. 
The interrelationship of anxiety and objective self-awareness is con-
sidered, as is the interrelationship of anxiety-and social faci'litation. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The concepts of anxiety, self-awareness, and social facilitation 
have had extensive investigations within the field of psychology. The 
present revi ev1 wi 11 focus upon: ( 1) anxiety effects on performance, 
(2) objective self-awareness, and (3) social facilitation effects on 
performance. 
Anxiety 
According to ~1ay (1950, p. 191), "anxiety is the apprehension cued 
off by a threat to some value which the individual holds essential to 
his existence as a personality.•• The individual experiences subjective 
feelings of uncertainty and helplessness. The focus of normal anxiety 
is a perceived threat to the individual •s security pattern; i.e., the 
stratagems which have developed through successful coping with stress-
ful situations suddenly seem inadequate. The centrality of the anxiety 
focus differentiates it from a fear response, which is directed toward 
some objectifiable danger or stressor stimuli. 
Rather anxiety is objectless because it strikes at that basis 
of the psychological structure on which the perception of 
one•s self as distinct from the world of objects occurs. 
Sullivan has remarked that the self-dynamism is developed in 
order to protect the individual from anxiety. The converse 
is as true, that mounting anxiety reduces self-awareness. 
In proportion to the increase in anxiety, the awareness of 
one•s self as subject related to objects in the external 
world is confused. Awareness of one•s self is simply a 
correlate of awareness of objects in the external world. 
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It is precisely this differentiation between subjectivity 
and objectivity which breaks down in proportion to the 
severity of the anxiety experiences (May, 1950~ p. 192). 
Perception of an anxiety state requires a new attentional focus. 
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Attention which was previously occupied in world perception and objec-
tive self-awareness is now drawn to an anxiety-monitoring process. As 
long as the amount of experienced anxiety is within acceptable bounds, 
the individual can respond to a generalized environmental threat with 
increased vigilance and renewed efforts. As anxiety increases, it 
occupies a larger portion of the available attention to the detriment 
of objective self-awareness and world perception. When the amount of 
anxiety exceeds the individual's capacity for anxiety tolerance, the 
differentiation between the self and the world is confused. The indi-
vidual's attentional focus vacillates between world perception and 
self-monitoring processes with a practical exclusion of objective self-
awareness. This results in unreliable environmental perceptions due to 
the instability of the attentional focus as well as the lack of objec-
tive self-awareness. As long as the amount of experienced anxiety 
exceeds acceptable bounds, it is unlikely that the individual can 
respond to environmental or task-relevant cues with either accuracy or 
clarity. The confusion in perception and utilization of information 
would be reflected in performance decrements. 
In sullnllary, the distinction beb1een objective and subjective self-
awareness requires an attentional focus differentiation. In subjective 
self-awareness, attention is directed to external events. The indivi-
dual does not engage in self-evaluation~ In objective self-awareness, 
the individual is the object of his/her own consciousness and will 
compare the self with an internalized standard of excellence. Objective 
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self-awareness conditions appear to motivate the individual to attempt 
to improve task performance in order to avoid negative self-evaluation. 
The relationship between objective self-awareness and self-esteem 
depends upon the amount of discrepancy experienced during self-
evaluation. A negative re-evaluation of self-esteem energizes an 
anxiety response, which results in a redistribution of attention. 
Anxiety•s Effect on Performance 
Isolation of the origin of anxiety responses has reflected the 
practical concerns of the personality theorists. Freud (1936) felt 
that anxiety was the result of libido repression. Anxiety is also the 
apprehension involved in separation (Rank, 1929). Adler indirectly 
indicates that anxiety is a response to the perception of one•s own 
weaknesses and inferiority feelings (Wolfe, 1930). Anxiety has also 
been defined as an apprehension of disapproval from significant others 
in interpersonal relationships (Sullivan, 1949). A two-faceted approach 
emphasizing both repression of guilt and a fear of social punishment 
was advanced by Mowrer (1949). The common factor in the origin of 
anxiety reactions appears to be an ego-threat arising either through 
intrapsychic or psycho-social conflict. For the purposes of this re-
search, I have chosen Spielberger•s (1972) definition of anxiety as a 
transitory emotional state consisting of feelings of apprehension, ten-
sion, and autonomic nervous system arousal (A-state) or as a relatively 
consistent elevated individual level of anxiety proneness (A-trait). 
According to Epstein (1967), anxiety states (A-state anxiety, in 
Spielberger•s terms) are evoked by three basic conditions: primary 
overstimulation, cognitive incongruity, and response unavailability. 
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Anxiety states are therefore situation-specific. The anxiety experi-
ence terminates with either resolution of the conflict or removal from 
the provoking situation. In contrast, anxiety trait (Spielberger's 
A-trait) may be manifested across a large proportion of situations or 
strongly manifested in a few key situations. Endler and Hunt (1969) 
postulate that trait anxiety may be evoked by remembered conflicts or 
ego-threatening situations. The energization of the anxiety trait de-
pends on the amount and salience of personal ego-involvement. Ego-
involved conditions, such as those that pose a threat to personal 
adequacy and self-esteem, produce differential responding on A-state 
for high and low A-trait individuals (Hodges, 1968; Rappaport & Katkin, 
1972). When ego-threat is intense, A-state arousal is positively re-
lated to the level of A-trait, but is not consistently so related when 
ego-threat is less intense (~1cAdoo, 1969). Con-ditions that do not 
pose a psychological threat to self-esteem produce no consistent 
differences for high and low A-trait individuals (Hodges, 1968; Katkin, 
1965). 
Test anxiety has two major components: worry, described as cogni-
tive concern over performance; and emotionality, or autonomic arousal 
(Liebert & Morris, 1967). These components have a differential impact 
on performance. Berlyne (1967) states that intermediate arousal facil-
itates maximum efficiency on performance tasks, whereas super-normal 
arousal levels produce interference effects and decrease performance. 
Sub-normal arousal potentiates mainly an orienting reflex (Sokolov, 
1958). 
While emotionality, or arousal, does not consistently affect task 
performance, vwrry scores have been significantly associated with both 
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task difficulty and time required to complete intellectual-cognitive 
tasks on five WAIS subtests (Liebert & ~1orris, 1967). This supports an 
attentional interpretation of test-anxiety results; performance decre-
ments are observed when the subject divides attention between cognitive 
self-perception and task variables. Wine (1971), in an extensive 
review of the anxiety literature, suggests that the test-anxious person 
usually divides his/her attention between task-relevant cues and percep-
tion of the internal anxiety state. As self-perception detracts both 
time and attention from task-relevant cues, highly test-anxious indivi-
duals perform more poorly, on the average, than individuals with low 
;~.. . 
test anxiety. Wine's (1971) review article also provides a summary 
source for the following research conclusions concerning the effects of 
anxiety on performance. 
In general, highly anxious subjects tend to engage in self-
deprecation and self-preoccupation while in the anxiety provoking situ-
ation. They blame themselves for their failures, even when the failure 
was determined arbitrarily, significantly more than do low anxious sub-
jects (Doris & Sarason, 1955). This process of negative self-evaluation 
for anxious subjects seems to operate independently of judgments of 
actual performance. High-anxiety subjects in an evaluative situation 
report overly negative self-evaluations and underestimate positive 
aspects of their own performance (Clark & At'kowitz, 1975). Identical 
feedback is perceived as being more negative by high-anxiety than by 
low-anxiety individuals, and operates in conjunction with an expectancy 
of negative evaluations from others (Smith & Sarason, 1975). Audience 
presence during task performance often constitutes a source of paten-
tial or implied evaluation. Presence of others tends to debilitate 
10 
task performance for subjects high in test anxiety and to facilitate 
performance for low-anxiety subjects (Cox, 1966; Ganzer, 1968; Henchy 
& Glass, 1968). The general conclusion from these experiments supports 
an attentional focus interpretation of anxiety•s relationship to per-
formance. 
The similarities between the pattern of results for highly-anxious 
and objectively self-aware individuals suggest that people engage in 
self-evaluation and respond to an ego-threatening discrepancy with 
anxiety only while objectively self-aware. The effects on attentional 
focus of anxiety are confounded with a state of objective self-awareness 
as long as a negative discrepancy is realized during self-evaluation. 
However, a state of objective self-awareness may exist independently of 
anxiety states given that a positive discrepancy is experienced. 
In summary, anxiety may refer to a transitory emotional state con-
sisting of feelings of apprehension, tension, and autonomic arousal 
(A-state) or to a relatively consistent elevated individual level of 
anxiety proneness (A-trait). A-state is situation-specific, while A-
trait is manifested in a variety of situations. Anxiety occurs in 
response to an ego-threat. Low anxiety states tend to facilitate per-
formance while high anxiety states tend to debilitate performance, 
possibly due to attentional interference. 
Objective Self-Awareness 
Wicklund and Duval •s theory of objective self-awareness (1972) 
draws a distinction between objective and subjective self-awareness. 
In subjective self-awareness (SSA), attention is directed to events 
external to the experiencing self. The self is merely the source of 
perception and action. Since the self is not conceptualized as an 
object in the world, it is exempt from evaluation with a standard of 
excellence. The individual is 11 Self-aware 11 only in the sense of an 
origin point for forces directed outward. 
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In objective self-awareness (OSA), attention is directed inward; 
that is, the individual is the object of his/her own consciousness and 
will compare the self with an internalized standard of excellence de-
rived through social influence and individual world experience. A 
variety of stimuli aid in provoking a state of objective self-awareness, 
such as presence of an evaluative audience (Cottrell, 1972), presence 
of a mirror~ and monitoring of a tape-recording of one•s own voice 
(Liebling & Shaver, 1973). As long as actual performance appears to be 
something less than the standard of excellence, the individual will ex-
perience negative self-evaluation accompanied by negative affect. 
Objective self-awareness appears to motivate the individual to attempt 
to improve task performance in order to avoid negative affect. The 
motivational consequences of negative self-evaluation lead individuals 
to attempt reduction of the discrepancies . 
. This end may be obtained in a variety of ways. One way is through 
reorganization of the perceptions of the object and situation evoking 
the discrepancy so that the new perception is in agreement with the 
standard of co\~rectness as well as with the prevailing social position. 
A second possibility for discrepancy reduction is to avoid the condi-
tions which tend to produce self-focused attention. This often 
includes physical as well as psychological distance assumed between the 
self and the objective self-awareness focusing stimuli. A third alter-
native may be used vJhen discrepancy is experienced in relation to a 
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social standard of correctness. Discrepancy reduction may occur 
through adoption of a conception, i.e., adoption of an opinion or posi-
tion held by the dominant group. This has the effect of reducing dis-
crepancies and contradictions between standards of correctness through 
conformity to the group standard. 
The relationship between objective self-ai'lareness and self-esteem 
depends on the amount of discrepancy experienced during self-evaluation. 
Close correspondence between perceived performance and the standard of 
correctness serves to maintain or increase self-esteem, while large 
negative discrepancies are a threat to self-esteem judgments. The 
individual experiencing a negative re-evaluation of self-esteem would 
logically be expected to respond with anxiety. The magnitude of the 
discrepancy may directly influence the amount of experienced anxiety, 
assuming a constancy in task relevance, amount of ego-involvement, and 
other situational and personal variables. 
Social Facilitation Effects on Performance 
Allport (1924) compared individual performance across a variety 
of tasks when each person worked alone and with others present. In 
general, there was an increase in speed and quantity of performance on 
the simpler tasks when others were present. Social facilitation was 
therefore narrowly defined as the increase in behavior that results 
from the sight or sound of others making the same movements. 
Subsequent investigators documented differential effects on per-
formance in relation to presence versus absence of social others. The 
magnitude and direction of these social facilitation effects depend on 
the specific task, the setting, and interpersonal relations among 
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group members (Kelley & Thibaut), 1969). In general, the task charac-
teristics which influence performance include task complexity, amount 
of prior exposure to similar tasks, and the relative dominance of 
response patterns. Performance on simple tasks which require emission 
of previously acquired skills or dominant responses tends to be posi-
tively affected by presence of others. A gain in speed and quality of 
response emission is observed in both togetherness and group situations 
for simple tasks. These tasks involve simple motoric responses and 
overlearned cognitive skills such as pursuit-rotor (Travis, 1925), 
signal detection (Bergum & Lehr, 1963), and syllable recall (Pessin, 
1925). 
Performance of more complex tasks requiring the acquisition of 
new responses such as learning nonsense syllables (Cottrell, Wack, 
Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968; Zajonc & Sales, 1966) tends to be impaired by 
the presence of others. These tasks involve an emission of new and 
subordinate responses which is negatively affected by the presence of 
others. That is, speed and quality of response emission is reduced 
when others are present during complex task performance. Zajonc (1965) 
attempted to encompass the diverse results of experiments on social 
facilitation with the concept of arousal of a nonspecific drive state. 
Within his theoretical framework, 11 mere 11 presence of others during 
task performance aids in the creation of a drive state which energizes 
available habits. These habits may be either dominant or subordinate 
responses within the situation. Presence of others energizes emission 
of dominant, \'-/ell-learned performance responses, while impairing emis-
sion of subordinate, acquisitive learning responses (Fitts & Posner, 
1966; Walker, 1966; Zajonc & Sales, 1966). 
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The mere presence hypothesis was revised by Cottrell (1968) in 
order to interpret the results of an experiment involving three condi-
tions: subject alone, audience present but blindfolded (mere pres-
ence), and audience present (Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968). 
A social facilitation effect was obtained only for the audience present 
condition. This led Cottrell to hypothesize that presence of others 
increased drive level only when it fostered an anticipation by the sub-
ject of positive or negative outcomes. 
A subsequent revision suggested that audience presence implied 
personal evaluation, and that the apprehension created by anticipated 
evaluation enhanced emission of dominant responses (Henchy & Glass, 
1968). The degree of evaluation apprehension is determined by the 
nature of the interpersonal relations between the subjects and the 
audience members. Subjects may respond to certain characteristics of 
the audience, such as perceived status and expertise, with correspond-
ent amounts of experienced apprehension. In order to test the media-
tion value of evaluator status, Henchy and Glass (1968) utilized four 
conditions: subject alone, expert audience, nonexpert audience, and 
taped performance for later expert evaluation. The largest social 
facilitation effect obtained was for the expert audience condition, 
followed by anticipated evaluation, nonexpert audience, and alone con-
ditions. Even with an audience absent, anticipation of evaluation 
produces energizing effects on performance. These results suggest 
that the mediating mechanism for social facilitation effects is evalu-
ation apprehension rather than unqualified presence of others. 
When an audience is present, the individual may show increased 
efforts to attain high standards in order to reduce the discrepancy 
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between aspirations and current performance, particularly if the audi-
ence is perceived as possessing expertise in the task area or implies 
evaluation. Even the experimenter, whether physically or electronical-
ly present, functions as an audience with a resultant impact on per-
formance (Gadlin & Ingle, 1975). 
Summary 
Four general conclusions can be drawn from the literature reviews: 
1. Anxiety, self-awareness, and the facilitating presence of 
others each affect the individual's attentional focus. 
2. Social facilitation improves performance on simple or well-
learned tasks positively while impairing performance on more complex 
or novel tasks. 
3. Objective sel f-avJareness conditions appear to motivate the 
individual to attempt to improve task performance while concurrently 
occupying a portion of the available attentional time in self-
monitoring procedures. 
4. Low anxiety tends to facilitate task performance while high 
anxiety debilitates performance. 
CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The literature reviewed suggests that performance on a given task 
may fluctuate as a function of attentional variables. In situations 
involving the presence of others, some amount of attention is required 
to perceive and evaluate the others' characteristics and to infer their 
evaluations of one's own self. With objective self-awareness some 
attention is engaged in self-evaluation rather than in task considera-
tion. When sufficient anxiety is experienced, some attention is 
utilized in self-monitoring procedures. to the exclusion of immediate 
task perception. Anxiety also has an interactional effect with both 
social facilitation and self-awareness conditions; anxiety establishes 
an attentional demand which competes with both self-perception and 
perception of others. 
This study was designed to investigate three separate phenomena: 
1. The differential effects of high and low state anxiety on task 
performance, specifically through manipulation of evaluation apprehen-
sion. 
2. The effect on task performance of high and low objective self-
awareness conditions as manipulated with presence or absence of a 
mirror, a stimulus provoking self-focused objective attention. 
3. The social facilitation effect of presence versus absence of 
social others on amount of task performance. 
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The following hypotheses were generated for the study: 
1. Overall performance will be affected by the amount of energized 
state anxiety. 
(a) Performance will be impaired by high state anxiety. 
(b) Performance will be improved by low state anxiety. 
2. Objective self-awareness will interact with anxiety to impair 
performance. 
(a) High objective self-awareness wi 11 improve performance. 
(b) Low objective self-awareness will impair performance. 
(c) High state anxiety and low objective self-awareness will 
interact to give the poorest performance .. 
(d) Low state anxiety and high objective self-awareness will 
interact to foster superior performance. 
3. Presence of an audience will have a differential impact on 
performance as a function of state anxiety. 
(a) Audience presence and low state anxiety vJi ll improve per-
formance. 
(b) Audience presence and high state anxiety will impair per-
formance. 
To investigate these hypotheses, female subjects were matched on 
A-trait scores derived from the Taylor Manifest Scale (see Appendix). 
A-state as manifested in evaluation apprehension was manipulated by 
means of differentially focused instructions emphasizing either a lack 
of concern for individual performance (low A-state) or a concern for 
possible correlations between performance scores and intelligence (high 
A-state). Subjects were assigned to either a high or low evaluation 
apprehension condition and one of the following conditions: high versus 
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low objective self-awareness, or high versus low social facilitation. 
The dependent variables were obtained scores on a Bead Sorting task 
and the Block Design and Digit Symbol subtests of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale, Form II. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 40 white female undergraduate Psychology I stu-
dents who received bonus points for participating. 
Apparatus 
Subjects reported singly to a 15' x 18' laboratory room equipped 
with desks, chairs, and a 4' x 4' one-way observation window with 
drapes. 
During the experiment the subjects were required to complete the 
Digit Symbol and Block Design subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Scale, Form II. Block Design is primarily a test of visual-motor 
coordination requiring pattern perception, analysis into component 
parts, and synthesis into an organized whole. Digit Symbol measures 
the speed and accuracy of new association formation. Of the Wechsler 
subtests, it is one of the more sensitive to the effects of anxiety 
(Robb, Bernandoni & Johnson, 1972). A standard stopwatch was used to 
time the subtests. The subjects were also administered a bead-sorting 
task. A bead pool consisting of 100 wooden beads .33" in diameter was 
formed with 20 red, 20 black, 20 green, 20 blue, 10 orange, and 10 tan 
beads. The subject was required to singly sort these beads into color 
groups with a one-minute time limit. 
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Procedure 
Due to the research mentioned previously concerning differential 
responding on A-state for high and low A-trait individuals (Hodges~ 
1968; Katkin, 1965; Rappaport & Katkin, 1972}, A-trait was considered 
a nuisance variable and controlled by the use of matched subjects. 
Subjects were matched on obtained scores on the Taylor ~1anifest Anxiety 
Scale (see Appendix} which was administered approximately one month 
prior to the experiment. Subjects scoring above the 50th percenti 1 e 
were assigned to the high A-trait block, while those scoring below the 
50th percentile were assigned to the low A-trait block. Taylor (1953} 
computed a percentile rank of 50 for subjects whose raw score was 
approximately 13; the 50th percentile score for subjects serving in this 
research project fell at a mean raw score of 13.4. An equal number of 
subjects (.!!_ = 20) were obtained for the high and lo\IJ A-trait blocks. 
In order to reduce the possibility that subjects \'foul d suspect a connec-
tion between the administration of the Taylor scale and the subsequent 
laboratory experiment, they were recruited by different individuals. 
One subject recognized the experimenter and expressly connected the two 
procedures; her data were not used in the analyses. 
The subjects were recruited for a learning experiment. When a sub-
ject arrived at the laboratory she was greeted by a female experimenter 
and escorted to the laboratory room. After the subject was seated at a 
desk facing the observation window, the experimenter left. The subject 
was given five minutes for orientation to the setting. Then the experi-
menter returned and delivered the instructions which constituted the 
evaluation apprehension manipulation. The instructions were adapted 
from Liebling and Shaver (1973) in order to allow comparison of 
results. 
For the low evaluation conditions the instructions were as 
follows: 
We are interested in investigating how people learn. 
Actually, this is a pilot study for a project in which sub-
jects will complete tasks of graded difficulty. Before we 
can perform any study on the effects of varying levels of 
difficulty, we must unambiguously establish a scale to mea-
sure the difficulty of the tasks. This is the purpose of the 
pilot study. By measuring how much of a given task a random 
sample of people can complete accurately within a standard 
time period, we can rank order the tasks by difficulty. 
Please work as accurately and quickly as possible. Do you 
have any questions before we begin? 
For the high evaluation conditions the instructions were as 
follows: 
We are interested in investigating how people learn. 
The purpose of this study is to examine your ability to com-
plete tasks of graded difficulty. The general hypothesis is 
that this ability may correlate v-1ith other skills such as 
reaction time, visual-motor coordination~ concentration and 
memory. It has already been demonstrated that the ability 
to complete these tasks accurately is a good predictor of 
such things as IQ and grade point. In this experiment we 
will be correlating your performance with your overall grade 
point average which is available to this research project 
from the Registrar•s office. Please work as accurately and 
quickly as possible. Do you have any questions before we 
begin? 
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The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the following condi-
tions: high objective self-awareness (hi OSA), and low objective self-
awareness (lo OSA); or they were assigned to one of the following 
conditions: high social facilitation (hi SF) and low social facilita-
tion (lo SF). The objective self-awareness and social facilitation 
conditions were tested separately. The social facilitation conditions 
are described below. The hi OSA condition involved exposure of the 
mirrored side of the observation window directly in front of the 
subject. For the lo OSA condition the drapes were closed concealing 
the mirror. The experimenter did not direct attention to the mirror 
in any way for either condition. 
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The social facilitation conditions involved the presence of one 
male and one female confederate who were introduced as either fellow 
subjects or performance evaluators. In the lo SF condition the con-
federates watched the real subject perform the task. In the hi SF 
condition they occupied the same positions in the room but were intro-
duced as performance evaluators. No verbal communication was allowed 
between subjects and confederates. 
The experimenter administered the Block Design, Digit Symbol, and 
Bead Sorting tasks in counterbalanced order. Upon completion of the 
tasks the subjects were debriefed. The debriefing procedure included 
an explanation of the deceptions and the purpose of the experimental 
manipulations. Specifically, subjects were informed that the hypothe·· 
ses of interest concerned the effects of anxiety on performance and 
that the instructions were designed to manipulate anxiety level. 
Assurances were given that grade point averages would not be obtained 
from the Registrar's office nor would correlations be made between per-
formance scores and intelligence test scores. Additional debriefing 
points were specific to the subjects' experimental condition. Each 
subject was given an overview of the experimental design and dismissed 
after pledging not to discuss the experiment with any other potential 
subject. After the data were collected and analyzed, the experimenter 
visited each class from which subjects were obtained and reported the 
findings and conclusions. 
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Overview of Exper·imental Design 
Tv,renty white female subjects, matched on H-tra it, were randomly 
assigned to each cell of 2x2 design in v,rhich t~e variables were high 
versus low evaluation apprehension and high versus low objective self-
awareness. Twenty similar subjects, also matched on A-trait, were 
assigned to a 2x2 design in which the variables were high versus low 
evaluation apprehension and high versus low social facilitation. In 
addition, separate a priori tests were performed for differences 
between the objective self-awareness and social facilitation conditions. 
The dependent variables were obtained scores on the digit symbol, block 
design, and bead sorting tasks. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
A separate 2x2 factorial analysis of variance was performed for 
the block design, digit symbol, and bead sorting data for both the ob-
jective self-awareness and social facilitation conditions. The overall 
means and standard deviations for each task as well as the means for 
each condition are reported in Table I. In general, performance was 
superior for the low objective self-awareness and low social facilita-
tion conditions as compared to the high objective self-awareness and 
high social facilitation conditions. 
Effects of State Anxiety ~·1anipulation 
The hypothesized differential effects on performance as a function 
of energized state anxiety (as presumed from the evaluation instruc-
tions) was not supported (as per hypotheses l(a), l(b), 2(c), 2(d), 
3(a), and 3(b)). No significant differences were obtained for any 
experimental task. Task performance scores for block design, as re-
ported in Tables II and III, reflected no significant differences as a 
function of evaluation condition for either the objective self-
awareness condition, F(l ,16) = 2.97, or the social facilitation condi-
tion, F(l,l6) = 1.6. A similar pattern of results was obtained for the 
digit symbol and bead sorting tasks. The objective self-awareness 
conditions had no significant evaluation component, F(l,l6) = 1.36 and 
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TABLE I 
PERFORMANCE MEANS BY TASK AND CONDITION 
Block Bead 
Evaluation Attention N Design Symbol Sorting 
High 
1 1 hi OSA* 5 8.80 12.2 44.6 
1 2 lo OSA 5 11.40 15.4 47.6 
1 3 hi SF* 5 8.20 12.8 48.6 
1 4 lo SF 5 12.20 . 14.2 42.0 
Low 
2 1 hi OSA 5 9.60 11.2 41.0 
2 2 lo OSA 5 12.00 15.0 50.8 
2 3 hi SF 5 7.60 10.4 37.2 
2 4 1o SF 5 11.60 13.8 45.6 
Attention 
1 hi OSA 10 9.20 11.7 42.8 
2 1o OSA 10 11.70 15.2 49.2 
3 hi SF 10 7.90 11.6 42.9 
4 lo SF 10 11.90 14.0 43.8 
Evaluation 
1 hi 20 10.15 13.65 45.70 
2 lo 20 10.20 12.60 43.65 
Overall means 40 10.175 13.125 44.675 
Standard deviation 1.960 2.320 9.000 
*OSA stands for objective self-awareness; SF refers to social 
facilitation. 
Source 
Block Design 
OSA 
Evaluation 
Interaction 
Error 
Total 
Digit S_ymbol 
OSA 
Evaluation 
Interaction 
Error 
Total 
Bead Sorting 
OSA 
Evaluation 
Interaction 
Error 
Total 
TABLE II 
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR 
OBJECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS CONDITIONS 
df ss ms F Value 
1 31.25 31.25 37.88 
1 2.45 2.45 2.97 
1 0.05 0.05 0.06 
16 13.20 0.825 
19 46.95 
1 61.25 61.25 34.03 
1 2.45 2.45 1. 36 
1 0.45 0.45 0.25 
16 28.80 1.80 
19 92.95 
1 204.80 204.80 2.23 
1 0.20 0.20 0.002 
57.80 57.80 0.628 
16 1471.20 91.95 
19 1734.00 
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.005 
ns 
ns 
.005 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
Source 
Block Design 
SF 
Evaluation 
Interaction 
Error 
Total 
Digit S~mbol 
SF 
Evaluation 
Interaction 
Error 
Total 
Bead Sorting 
SF 
Evaluation 
Interaction 
Error 
Total 
TABLE III 
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR 
SOCIAL FACILITATION CONDITIONS 
df ss ms F Value 
1 80 80 71 . 11 
1 1.8 1.8 1.60 
0 0 0 
16 18 1.125 
19 99.8 
1 28.8 28.8 6.62 
1 9.8 9.8 2.25 
1 5.0 5.0 1.15 
16 69.6 69.6 
19 113.2 113.2 
1 4.05 4.05 .065 
1 76.05 76.05 1.22 
1 281.25 281.25 4.52 
16 995.20 62.20 
19 1356.55 
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E. 
.005 
ns 
.025 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
.06 
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F(l,l6) = .002 for each task, respectively. The social facilitation 
conditions also showed no significant impact of the evaluational condi~ 
tion, as shown by an obtained F(l ,16) = 2.25 for digit symbol and 
F(l,l6) = 1.22 for the bead sorting task. 
Objective Self-Awareness 
Significant effects of objective self-awareness conditions on task 
performance were obtained for the block design, F(l ,16) = 37.88, £ < 
.005,and digit symbol tasks, F(l,l6) = 34.03, £ < .005, as reported in 
Table II. A nonsignificant difference for the bead sorting task was 
obtained, F(l,l6) = 2.28. These effects were contrary to the hypothe-
sized direction (see hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b)). Performance was signi-
ficantly superior for the low as compared to the high objective 
self-awareness conditions for both block design; !(18) = 5.98, £ < 
.0005, and digit symbol, !(18) = 5.995, £ < .0005. 
Social Facilitation 
Presence of a non-evaluative audience facilitated task performance 
while presence of an expressly evaluative audience resulted in perform-
ance decrements as hypothesized (hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b)). Significant 
social facilitation effects were obtained for block design, F(l,l6) = 
71.11, £ < .005, and digit symbol tasks, F(l,l6) = 6.62, £ < .025, as 
I 
reported in Tab'le III. No significant differences were obtained for 
the bead sorting task, F(l,l6) = .065. 
Performance under the low social facilitation condition was signi-
ficantly superior to high social facilitation condition performance for 
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both block design and digit symbol, t(l8) = 2.48, £ < .05 and t(18) = 
8.528, £ < .0005, respectively. 
Evaluational Interaction 
The analysis of variance summary for bead sorting is reported in 
Tables II and III. Performance on the simple motoric task reflected 
no significant differences between either evaluation, objective self-
awareness, or social facilitation conditions; although a significant 
interaction was approached between evaluational and social facilitation 
conditions for this task alone, F(l,l6) = 4.52, £ < .06. Performance 
on the bead sorting task was positively correlated with both block de-
sign,~= .43, £ < .006, and digit symbol, r = .43, £ < .0055. Perform-
ance on block design and digit symbol was also positively correlated, 
r = .61, £ < .0001. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The interrelations of self-awareness, social facilitation, and 
anxiety are complex, and, to a degree, specific to the individual. 
Certain consistent patterns of the effects of these factors were iso-
lated in the present experiment. Although these patterns of results 
did not fully support the previous findings in the areas of objective 
self-awareness and social facilitation, they are consistent with Wine•s 
(1971) conclusions drawn from a review of the effects of anxiety on 
attention. 
Anxiety 
It was predicted from the available information of the effects of 
anxiety on performance that high state anxiety tends to impair perform-
ance. The hypothesis of differential effects on performance as a func-
tion of energized state anxiety, specifically evaluation apprehension, 
was not supported by the experimental results. This finding may be due 
to failure of the instructions to actually manipulate anxiety level. 
The subjects arrived at the laboratory with an unknown degree of expec-
tation of personal evaluation. The instructions did not seem to be very 
effective in manipulating this expectation, particularly since even 
those subjects who should not have had the expectation for evaluation 
were individually administered the tasks and performance was scored 
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within her field of vision. Regardless of the instructional set, each 
subject must have perceived the situation as highly evaluative. As 
Gadlin and Ingle (1975) have noted, the experimenter functions as an 
audience, and has an impact on performance. In this case, the experi-
menter•s effect may have been to produce an evaluation apprehension of 
sufficient strength to override the separate evaluation manipulation. 
The digit symbol task results did approach significance for the 
evaluation conditions. Of all the experimental tasks, the digit symbol 
may be the most sensitive to the effects of anxiety. Digit symbol per-
formance is influenced by both attention span and level of anxiety 
(Robb, Bernandoni, & Johnson, 1972). The superior performance of the 
low objective self-awareness and low social facilitation groups suggests 
that it was also sensitive to interference effects on attentional focus. 
These interference effects were created by competing stimuli in the 
high objective self-awareness and high social facilitation conditions. 
An attentional focus interpretation can encompass the pattern of 
results; i.e., to the extent that anxiety energizes a redistribution of 
attention, performance decrements are observed. 
Objective Self-Awareness 
According to the theoretical position of Duval and Wicklund (1972), 
a state of high objective self-awareness motivates the individual to 
attempt to reduce the perceived discrepancies between actual perform-
ance and a standard of excellence. The objective self-awareness condi-
tions did reflect performance differences regardless of the subjects• 
evaluation condition, but these differences were contrary to the 
predictions of objective se 1 f-avvareness them~y. Performance was 
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superior in the low objective self-awareness conditions relative to 
the high objective self-awareness conditions. The individual•s per-
formance of tasks requiring the acquisition of new response patterns 
was debilitated by high objective self-awareness. Liebling and Shaver 
(1973) obtained a similar pattern of results under high evaluation con-
ditions. Pet~formance decrements were observed on a relatively simple 
though novel letter copying task for persons who were made self-aware 
with presence of a mirror. This suggests that presence of a mirror, a 
stimulus encouraging a state of objective self-awareness, was effective 
in manipulating attentional focus in the direction of self-perception 
to the detriment of task-related cue perception. 
The superiority of performance in the low objective self-awareness 
conditions relative to the high objective self-awareness conditions, 
though contrary to the predictions of objective·self-awareness theory, 
are consistent with generalized drive theory (Spence, 1960). With com-
plex learning tasks a hierarchy of competing response tendencies 
exists; a variety of responses of varying strengths are available. If 
the habit strength or the initial probability of the correct response 
is greater than that of the incorrect response, under conditions of 
higher drive level the task should be learned quickly and with fewer 
errors. Therefore, a factor which may have affected performance under 
both objective self-awareness conditions was the subjects• inability 
to formulate a standard of correctness for the tasks under considera-
tion. The nature of the experimental tasks made determination of a 
standard of correctness virtually impossible without prior exposure to 
similar tasks. Each subject was incapable of arriving at accurate 
evaluations of current performance, as well as unable to avoid the 
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condition of self-focused attention. When the correct response is 
initially weaker than competing incorrect responses, conditions of high 
drive such as anxiety-provoking siutations increase the probability of 
a wrong response resulting in performance decrements. The greater 
drive level of anxious or objectively self-aware persons increases the 
probability of incorrect responses due to the adverse difference in the 
competing excitatory potentials or response probabilities associated 
with the response hierarchy. Performance tended to reflect the effects 
of attentional shifts between the task and the self as well as task-
interfering responses. With high objective self-awareness the self-
focusing stimuli were sufficient to result in performance decrements. 
Social Facilitation 
Performance was also impaired by high social facilitation condi-
tions. The individual tended to perform more poorly when others were 
present as evaluators rather than fellow subjects. These results are 
similar to those obtained for unfamiliar tasks by Cottrell et al. 
(1968) and Henchy and Glass (1968). Implied evaluation did not in-
crease performance; rather performance was debilitated by presence of 
evaluative others. This suggests an attentional focus interpretation, 
i.e., to the extent that the individual engaged in perception and 
monitoring of the evaluative others, accurate perception of task cues 
was impaired. 
A significant interaction was obtained between attention and 
evaluation conditions for the bead sorting task only. This result must 
be interpreted in light of the previously mentioned failure to effec-
tively manipulate evaluation apprehension. Since each subject must be 
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presumed to have been responding to a highly evaluative situation, 
differences in task performance reflected the effects of the particular 
attentional condition. 
Attentional Focus 
It has been assumed that testing situations energize two kinds of 
drives (Mandler & Sarason, 1952). One is a learned task drive which is 
reduced by response sequences leading to task completion. The other is 
a learned anxiety drive, which may elicit anxiety-reducing task comple-
tion responses or anxiety-coping task interference responses. Within 
an experimental situation which maintains evaluation apprehension at a 
high level, any condition producing self-focused attention tends to 
evoke interference responses to anxiety states. Both high objective 
self-awareness and presence of evaluative others produce self-focused 
attention. Performance decrements were observed for these conditions. 
Avoidance of self-focused attentional states while in an anxiety-
provoking situation tends to improve task performance. Attention may 
be exclusively directed to accurate perception and effective utilization 
of task relevant cues. The anxiety drive state may be reduced by task 
completion responses which also serve to terminate the situational 
stress. 
In conclusion, the relationship between anxiety, self-awareness, 
and social facilitation is consistent with an attentional focus inter-
pretation. The greater the magnitude and intensity of these states, 
the less attention the individual has available for task perception. 
With objective self-awareness, high anxiety, and presence of evaluative 
others, attention is directed toward perception of internal self-
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monitoring processes and external world events. This process deprives 
attention from task performance. Subjective self-awareness~ low 
anxiety, and presence of nonevaluative peers allow attention to be 
focused on task-relevant cues with only minor interference from world 
perception. 
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APPENDIX 
TAYLOR MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE 
Answer based on your usual feelings. 
1 . I do not t i re q u i c k 1 y . 
2. I am often sick to my stomach. 
3. I am about as nervous as other people. 
4. I have ve1~y few headaches. 
5. I work under a great deal of strain. 
6. I cannot keep my mind on one thing. 
7. I worry over money and business. 
8. I frequently notice that my hand shakes when I try to do some-
thing. 
9. I blush as often as others. 
10. I have diarrhea (the runs) once a month or more. 
11. I worry quite a bit over possible troubles. 
12. I practically never blush. 
13. I am often afraid that I am going to blush. 
14. I have nightmares every few nights. 
15. My hands and feet are usually warm enough. 
16. I sweat very easily, even on cool days. 
17. When embarrassed I usually break out in a sweat which is very 
annoying. 
18. I do not often notice my heart pounding and I am seldom short of 
breath. 
19. I feel hungry most of the time. 
20. Often my bowels don't move for several days at a time. 
21. I have a great deal of stomach trouble. 
22. At times I lose sleep over worry. 
23. My sleep is restless and disturbed. 
24. I often dream about things I don't like to tell other people. 
25. I am easily embarrassed. 
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26. My feelings are hurt easier than most people. 
27. I often find :,:rself worrying about something. 
28. I wish I could be as happy as others. 
29. I usually am calm and not easily upset. 
30. I cry ea s i 1 y. 
31. I feel anxious about something or someone most of the time. 
32. I am happy most of the time. 
33. It makes me nervous to have to wait. 
34. At times I am so restless that I cannot sit in a chair for very 
long. 
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35. Sometimes I become so excited that I find it hard to get to sleep. 
36. I have often felt that I faced so many difficulties that I could 
not overcome them. 
37. At times I have been worried beyond reason about something that 
really did not matter. 
38. I do not have as many fears as my friends. 
39. I have been afraid of things or people that I know could not hurt 
me. 
40. I certainly feel useless at times. 
41. I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job. 
42. I am more self-conscious than other people. 
43. I am the kind of person who takes things hard. 
44. I am a very nervous person. 
45. Life is often a strain for me. 
46. At times I think I am no good at all. 
47. I am not at all confident of myself. 
48. ·At times I feel that I am going to crack up. 
49. I don•t like to face a difficulty or make an important decision. 
50. I am very confident of myself. 
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